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Following Dummett, a number of philosophers have responded to the
set-theoretic paradoxes by claiming that the concept set is indefinitely ex-
tensible [1]. One way of understanding this is in terms of ontological ex-
tensibility: however many sets there are, it is always possible that there be
more. In line with ontological extensibility, given that the sets are amongst
the entities, and given that whether or not a given entity is a set is modally
invariant: however many entities there are, it is always possible that there
be more. The challenge for the proponent of this view is to provide a sat-
isfactory account of the operative modality. Linnebo has recently proposed
that an individuative modality can underwrite a modal set theory, and sim-
ilar themes can be identified in Rayo’s work on ontology [3] [5]. In rough
outline, for both views, there will always be new ways of ‘carving up’ real-
ity linguistically, so as to yield new objects.
In his Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility, which draws inspiration from
[8], Uzquiano proposes an alternative understanding of indefinite extensi-
bility. Working in a fixed domain modal logic, he lays out a modalised
account of set formation. The modality is interpreted in terms of linguistic
extensibility. Whilst the existence of entities is fixed, the extensions of the
predicates ‘is a set’ and ‘∈’ are extensible, such that however many entities
(pairs) fall within their extension, it is always possible to extend the lan-
guage so that new entities (pairs) fall within their extension.
As an example, consider a given interpretation of the language, I. There
will be some xx such that xx are all and only the sets according to I. The
motivation behind indefinite extensibility is the thought that the process of
collecting objects together to form sets is unbounded above. Informally,
take any things you like, yy, there is some way of getting the set of yy. So
in particular, there is some way of getting the set of all those entities xx
that are sets according to I. But disaster lurks nearby. For the following
principle is plausible:
(COLLECTION) ∀xx(∀x(x ≺ xx→ α(x))→ ∃x ≡ xx)
Where α(x) reads ‘x is available to form a set’ and ‘x ≡ xx’ reads ‘x is the
set of xx’.
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Now if we capture the intuition that all the sets of I can be formed into a
set remembering that our choice of I is arbitrary as,
(AVAILIBILITY) ∀x((Set(x)→ α(x))
then a proof of Russell’s paradox is immediate: consider the xx which are
all x such that (Set(x) ∧ x /∈ x). There are such xx by plural comprehen-
sion, so by (AVAILIBILITY) and (COLLECTION) we have the existence
of the Russell set. Uzquiano’s solution is to modalise (AVAILIBILITY),
thus blocking the derivation,
(AVAILIBILITY♦) ∀x(Set(x)→ ♦α(x))
The modality indicated by the Diamond is interpretational,
. . .♦φ tells us that φ is true on some subsequent reinterpre-
tation of the set-theoretic vocabulary – while φ tells us
that φ remains true on all subsequent reinterpretations of the
set-theoretic vocabulary. [7, ]
According to (AVAILIBILITY♦) anything that is a set on one interpreta-
tion is available to form a set according to a subsequent interpretation. So
if all of yy are sets on one interpretation, it follows from (COLLECTION)
that there is a subsequent interpretation on which yy form a set.
Now consider xx, which are all and only the sets on I. Whilst there is
no set of xx according to I there is a subsequent reinterpretation I∗ of the
set-theoretic vocabulary on which xx form a set1. Paradox is avoided, and
due acknowledgement given to indefinite extensibility.
2. I
A certain metaphysical picture of sets underlies Uzquiano’s system. There
is, in general, no interpretation-independent fact of the matter whether some
entity is a set. We do have that once the extension of ‘Set()’ has been ex-
tended to include an entity, all subsequent interpretations will have that ob-
ject satisfying the predicate:
(Set) ∀x(Set(x)→ Set(x))
But not that anything that could be included in the interpretation of Set()
is a set,
(♦Set) ∀x(♦Set(x)→ Set(x))
1And, since Uzquiano’s system contains the closures of x ≺ xx → x ≺ xx and ¬x ≺
xx → ¬x ≺ xx, those xx that form a set according I are all and only xx according to
I∗.
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The failure of (♦Set) invites us to contemplate the possibility that there
is some object which, given our current interpretation of set-theoretic lan-
guage, we truthfully describe as a non-set but which, on a legitimate rein-
terpretation of the language, is truthfully described as a set2. Uzquiano
discusses how this consequence might be motivated metaphysically and an-
ticipates objections,
Perhaps we should think of a set as a mere node in a struc-
ture that satisfies certain formal conditions imposed by the
axioms at the outset. The set-theoretic universe could per-
haps be reduced to a domain of objects related by a formally
appropriate relation that satisfies the relevant axioms. . . But
one may well object to this that there is much more to the
element-set relation than to stand in a relation that satisfies
certain structural conditions, one may be tempted to dis-
miss the linguistic model of indefinite extensibility as a non-
starter. [7]
The structuralist flavour of this will receive attention in due course. Im-
mediately, however, it is clear that Uzquiano is correct in anticipating meta-
physical concerns about the project. The following principle commands
wide assent:
NMC No mathematical object is identical with any concre-
tum.
It is far from apparent that Uzquiano’s theory delivers (NMC). What
stops the interpreter of set theoretic language from re-interpreting her vo-
cabulary so that a certain cat is a set? If the answer is ‘nothing’, then there
are Lewisian worries: if Tiddles meets a sad end, this should not have math-
ematical implications [2, 13]. If the answer is ‘something’, then more is
required of the account of interpretation to cash that out. This issues aside,
(NMC) is surely part of our working understanding of mathematics. It is
open to the supporter of the re-interpretation account to acknowledge this
but to argue that our working understanding needs revising. In this eventu-
ality, the task is to assess the benefits of revision against the costs.
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Those costs are grave. What is on offer is a version of structuralism about
set theory. There is no more to being a set than being a satisfier of the pred-
icate Set() in an interpretation of the language which yields a ‘formally ap-
propriate’ membership relation. In order for the account to serve its stated
purpose of explicating indefinite extensibility, it is important that the struc-
turalism in question be in rebus rather than ante rem3. For suppose that any
adequate extension of the language satisying Uzquiano’s constraints should
2It is part of Uzquiano’s view that the urelemente are a proper subplurality of the non-sets.
3On structuralism, see e.g. [6]
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be understood as instancing an initial segment of an abstract structure. Then
the question about indefinite extensibility arises about the abstract structure,
and we are no further forward. Alternatively, one might propose an indefi-
nitely extensible series of such structures, each corresponding to a possible
extension of the language. But in this case, the explication of extensibility
in terms of linguistic extensions is not genuine: for what ultimately stands
in need of explanation here is the existence of the indefinitely extensible
series, which being ante rem is not susceptible to explanation in terms of
language use.
In rebus structuralism about mathematical theories faces what we might
call the not enough objects worry. Suppose I am a structuralist about anal-
ysis, that I accept only physical objects into my ontology, that spacetime is
not continuous, and that mereological composition is restricted4 Then there
aren’t going to be enough objects to instantiate the structure of R under <.
The moral of the story: in rebus structuralism is hostage to reality supply-
ing enough objects to instantiate the structures of our mathematical theories.
Uzquiano gives no indication of supporting an ontology as sparse as that
of our imagined physicalist. Successive re-interpretations of the language
might, then, extend the extension of ‘Set()’ so that it is satisfied by an
ever increasing number of abstracta (or of abstracta together with concreta).
However, the cardinality demands made by set theory are considerable.
Whilst Uzquiano flags that his ‘axioms do not, by themselves, tell us how
far we should proceed in the cumulative process of reinterpretation of the
set theoretic vocabulary’, the fact that he is working in a plural logic yields
a lower bound. Assuming that the intention is to be hermenutic, rather than
revisionary of set theory as practiced, we will want to validate ZFC. Plural
resources allow us to express Separation and Replacement as axioms, rather
than schemata (in the case of Replacement, we simulate quantification over
functions by plural quantification over tuples). This gives us a variant of
second-order ZF. On the standard semantics the smallest model of this is
strongly inaccessible.
Why should we believe that there are strongly inaccessible many ob-
jects? Absent an answer to this question, there is no reason to believe that
Uzquiano’s project provides a workable account of indefinite extensibility.
We need assurance that there is a sufficiently sized domain over which the
language can be re-interpreted. Of course, one excellent reason to believe
that there are at least strongly inaccessibly many objects is that one be-
lieves that set theory is true. But appeal to set theoretic ontology at this
point would be fatally circular. We need to be justified in accepting a suf-
ficiently sized ontology for reasons independent of set-theory in order to
4If the composition of physical objects satisfies classical extensional mereology then, given
ℵ0 physical objects as atoms, we get 2ℵ0 objects as required.
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motivate an understanding of indefinite extensibility in terms of linguistic
re-interpretation.
Some years ago James Mayberry wrote,
The universe of sets is not a structure: it is the world that all
mathematical structures inhabit, the sea in which they swim.
[4, 34]
The metaphors are compelling. If we but avail ourselves of set theory, un-
derstood in a non-structuralist fashion, we can – if we like – be structuralists
about other mathematical theories5, reassured that the universe of sets con-
tains enough objects to instantiate the structures described by these theories.
Those who would be in rebus structuralists about set theory itself need to
offer an alternative route to the requisite ontology. That task, in particu-
lar, awaits those who would understand indefinite extensibility in terms of
linguistic re-interpretation.
*
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5Or at least, most other mathematical theories. There are familiar problems around cate-
gory theory
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